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Getting research findings into practice
When to act on the evidence
Trevor A Sheldon, Gordon H Guyatt, Andrew Haines
There is increasing interest in providing evidence
based health care—that is, care in which healthcare
professionals, provider managers, those who commis›
sion health care, the public, and policymakers consist›
ently consider research evidence when making
decisions.1 2 Purchasers, for example, should be able to
influence the organisation and delivery of care (such as
for cancer3 and stroke services4) and the type and con›
tent of services (such as using chiropractic for back
pain or dilatation and curettage and drug treatment for
menorrhagia5). Policymakers should ensure that
policies on treatment reflect and are consistent with
research evidence, and that the incentive structure
within the health system promotes cost effective
practice. They must also ensure that there is an
adequate infrastructure for monitoring changes in
practice and for producing, gathering, summarising,
and disseminating evidence. Clinicians determine the
day to day care patients receive in healthcare systems,
and user groups (for example, patients, their families,
and their representatives) are also beginning to play an
important role in influencing healthcare decisions.6
The factors described below should be considered
when deciding whether to act on or promote the
implementation of research findings.
Convincing evidence of net benefit
Evaluating the methods of primary studies
Individual research studies vary in their degree of
bias—that is, how much they are likely to underestimate
or overestimate the effectiveness of an intervention.
Observational studies, in which investigators compare
the results of groups of patients who are receiving
different treatments based on the patient’s own or the
clinician’s preference, are susceptible to bias because
the prognosis of the groups is likely to differ in unpre›
dictable ways, leading to spuriously reduced or, more
commonly, inflated treatment effects.
Rigorous randomised control trials greatly reduce
bias by ensuring that the groups being compared are
similar.7 As long as patients are analysed in the groups
to which they were randomised, this type of trial
permits a more confident inference that the treatments
offered are responsible for differences in outcome.
Randomised controlled trials are useful not only for
testing the effectiveness of interventions in tightly con›
trolled clinical settings but also across a wide spectrum
of health research.8 9 Inferences are further strength›
ened if patients, care givers, and those assessing
outcomes are blind to the allocation of patients to
treatment or control groups and if follow up is
complete.10
While randomised controlled trials are often
regarded as the gold standard for comparing the
efficacy of treatments, other study designs are
appropriate for evaluating other types of healthcare
technologies, such as diagnostic tests, or for assessing
the potentially harmful effects of interventions.11
Qualitative methods are increasingly being used, for
example, to provide an understanding of patients’ and
professionals’ attitudes and behaviours, the effects of
culture, the context of healthcare, and their interac›
tions.12
Whatever the appropriate design, practitioners will
often discover that research evidence is biased or oth›
erwise limited; for example, the investigators may have
focused on inappropriate physiological end points
rather than outcomes relevant to patients.13 In
evaluations of the organisation of health care,
providers must consider whether treatment effects
were really due to the putative intervention; for exam›
ple, in randomised controlled trials that found a
positive effect of stroke units, was the impact really due
to the organisational structure or to the greater skill or
enthusiasm of those who established the units?4
Though practitioners will still need to use imperfect
research information, new clinical policies should not
be implemented unless clinicians find that there is
strong evidence of benefit.
Evaluating the methods and results of systematic
reviews
Systematic reviews can provide reliable summaries of
data that address targeted clinical questions; they can
also provide less biased estimates of treatment effects if
they adhere to the criteria shown in the box.14
Summary points
There is increasing interest in making clinical and
policy decisions based on research findings
Not all research findings should or can be
implemented; prioritisation is necessary
The decision whether to implement research
evidence depends on the quality of the research,
the degree of uncertainty of the findings,
relevance to the clinical setting, whether the
benefits to the patient outweigh any adverse
effects, and whether the overall benefits justify the
costs when competing priorities and available
resources are taken into account
Systematic reviews that show consistent results are
likely to provide more reliable research evidence
than non›systematic reviews or single studies
Researchers should design studies that take into
account how and by whom the results will be used
and the need to convince decision makers to use
the intervention studied
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A rigorous systematic review may sometimes leave
the decision maker who is reading it uncertain.
Classification of the strength of research evidence
should consider each of the following four points.
Firstly, the methodology of the primary studies may be
weak. Secondly, unexplained variability between study
results may lead to doubt about the results of studies
that show larger treatment effects or those that show
no benefit. Thirdly, small sample sizes may lead to wide
confidence intervals even after results have been
pooled across studies. Thus, the research evidence may
be consistent with a large or a negligible treatment
effect. Fourthly, because of the side effects associated
with a treatment, or their cost, the balance between
treating and not treating with an effective intervention
may be precarious.
Grades of the strength of the evidence of the effec›
tiveness of a treatment have been developed that
account for the type and quality of the study design
and the variability of study results.15 Thus, a systematic
review of randomised controlled trials that show
consistent results (such as trials of streptokinase for
treatment of acute myocardial infarction2) would be
graded as providing higher quality evidence than a
review of randomised controlled trials that show
variable results without a good explanation of the vari›
ability (heterogeneity).
The precision of the estimated treatment effect, and
the trade off between the benefits and risks could also
be considered. When assessing risks it is important to
note that many studies of efficacy, and reviews of these
studies, do not provide sufficient information about the
possible harm of treatments. Sample sizes in most ran›
domised trials are usually not large enough and the
study period not long enough to detect rare or long
term harmful effects.16 Large observational studies may
be useful in determining the probability of harm.17
Putting evidence of benefit into
perspective
Evidence of effectiveness alone does not imply that an
intervention should be adopted; adoption of an
intervention depends on whether the benefit is
sufficiently large relative to the risks and costs. For
example, the small positive effect of interferon beta in
the treatment of multiple sclerosis relative to its cost
makes implementation of its use questionable.18
One approach to the decision about whether an
intervention should be implemented is to determine a
threshold above which treatment would routinely be
offered and below which it would not. Decision makers
might consider the threshold in terms of the number
of patients one would need to treat to prevent a single
adverse event (such as a death).19 The threshold
number needed to treat defines the value above which
the disadvantages of treatment outweigh the benefits
(and treatment may therefore be withheld), and below
which the benefits outweigh the disadvantages (and
treatment may therefore be offered).20 Because the cost
of treatment and the benefit to the length and quality
of life vary, each intervention needs a separate thresh›
old; this threshold will also vary according to the values
of the patient, or population, being offered the
intervention.
When reliable data are available, a threshold might
be expressed in terms of a cost effectiveness ratio that
defines the cost of achieving a unit of benefit below
which an intervention is seen as worth implementing
routinely (for example, quality adjusted life years that
take social values about the equity of health and
resource allocation into account). Quantitative
research evidence is inevitably probabilistic and subject
to various forms of uncertainty; it is rarely the sole basis
of decision making at the governmental or clinical
level. Indeed, uncertainty is one obstacle to policymak›
ers using research evidence.21 People differ in their
willingness to take risks; these differences explain the
variations in decisions made when the same evidence is
evaluated by different people. However, research
evidence should play an important, and greater, part in
decision making and can provide a benchmark against
which decisions can be audited.
Applying research to practice
Whether research evidence can or should be applied to
a specific patient cannot always be deduced straightfor›
wardly from the research. Results of evaluative studies
are usually given as average effects. Patients may differ
from the average in ways that influence the effectiveness
of the treatment (relative risk reduction) or its impact
(absolute risk reduction).22 23 Factors that clinicians and
patients should consider before applying research
evidence to a specific case are summarised in the box.
Criteria that increase the reliability of a
systematic review
• Use of explicit criteria for inclusion and exclusion;
these should specify the population, the intervention,
the outcome, and the methodological criteria for the
studies included in the review
• Use of comprehensive search methods to locate
relevant studies, including searching a wide range of
computerised databases using a mixture of
appropriate key words and free text
• Assessment of the validity of the primary studies;
this should be reproducible and attempt to avoid bias
• Exploration of variation between the findings of the
studies
• Appropriate synthesis and, when suitable, pooling of
primary studies
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Patients who participate in trials may not be typical
of the types of the people for whom the treatment is
potentially useful.24 None the less, it is probably more
appropriate to assume that research findings are
generalisable across patients unless there is strong
theoretical or empirical evidence to suggest that a par›
ticular group of patients will respond differently.22
There may be a heterogeneity of effect across
patients because of biological, social, or other
differences that influence the effect of the intervention
or the risk of an adverse outcome.24 25 For example, â
blockers may be less effective than diuretics in lowering
blood pressure in black people of African descent than
in white populations.26 Interventions are more likely to
have a uniform impact when the effect of treatment is
purely a biological process, and where there is less
variation within the population than when many
factors specific to the patient or specific to the context
mediate the effect.27 The issue of whether treatment
effects are constant or are likely to be sensitive to
patient and context is important when targeting effec›
tive treatments to economically disadvantaged groups
of people with the aim of reducing inequalities in
health. If, for example, smoking cessation interventions
are less successful in poorer people, then such
programmes might not have the anticipated effects on
health equity.
Single patient randomised controlled trials (n of 1
trials) may help determine a particular patient’s
response to treatment in a number of chronic
conditions, including chronic pain syndromes such as
arthritis or chronic heart or lung disease, in which the
benefit of treatment may vary widely between
individual patients.28
Clinicians must carefully consider treatments in
patients for whom treatment may be contraindicated
or where there is substantial comorbidity. In patients
with comorbid conditions, a reduction in the risk of
dying from one disease might not reduce the overall
risk of dying because of the risk of a competing cause
of death.
The effect of an intervention may also vary because
patients do not share the same morbidity or risk.29 For
any given measurement of the effectiveness of
treatment patients at higher risk will generally
experience greater levels of absolute risk reduction or
impact from treatment.25 29–31 For example, patients at
high risk of dying from coronary heart disease who are
treated with drugs to lower cholesterol will experience
a greater reduction in the risk of dying than those at
lower risk—that is, 30 patients at high risk might have
to be treated for five years to save one life, but 300
patients at low risk would have to be treated to save one
life.32 33 Thus, a treatment that might be worth
implementing in a patient at high risk may not be
worth implementing in a patient at lower risk.32 33
The decision whether to use a treatment also
depends on factors that are specific to the patient. Cli›
nicians will find that research studies that consider a
range of important outcomes of treatment are more
useful than those which have only measured a few nar›
row clinical end points. More qualitative research done
within robustly designed quantitative studies will help
practitioners and patients to better understand and
apply the results of research.
Setting priorities
Implementation of research evidence occurs rarely
unless there are concerted attempts to get the results
into practice.34 It is impossible to promote actively the
implementation of the results of all systematic reviews
because of the limited capacity of healthcare systems to
absorb new research and the investment necessary to
overcome the obstacles of getting research into
practice. These costs must be considered in relation to
the likely return in terms of improvements in health.
The anticipated benefits of implementation vary
according to factors such as the divergence between
research evidence and current practice or the pressure
of policies that influence the marginal benefit of
further efforts at implementation.
When evaluating the same evidence different deci›
sion makers will use different criteria to prioritise treat›
ments for implementation. Policymakers, for example,
may look for societal gains in health and efficiency,
while clinicians may consider the wellbeing of their
patients to be most important.35 Formal decision
analysis may be helpful in setting priorities for
implementation and in applying research evidence to
the treatment of individual patients.36 37
The degree to which clinicians see even good qual›
ity research as able to be implemented will depend on
the extent to which the results conflict with
professional experience and beliefs. This reflects an
epistemological mismatch between the sort of evi›
dence that researchers produce and believe in and the
sort of evidence that practising clinicians value.38 In
many cases the implications of research evidence for
policy and practice are not straightforward or
obvious,39 and this ambiguity may result in the same
evidence giving rise to divergent conclusions and
actions.40 Depending on the perceived risks, the extent
of change required, and the quality and certainty of the
research results, many clinicians and policymakers will
wait for confirmatory evidence. When designing
studies investigators should consider how and by
whom their results will be used. The design should be
sufficiently robust, the setting sufficiently similar to that
in which the results are likely to be implemented, the
outcomes should be relevant, and the study size large
enough for the results to convince decision makers of
their importance.
Funding: None.
Conflict of interest: None.
Factors to consider when applying evidence to
individual patients
• Is the relative risk reduction that is attributed to the
intervention likely to be different in this case because
of the patient’s physiological or clinical characteristics?
• What is the patient’s absolute risk of an adverse
event without the intervention?
• Is there significant comorbidity or a contraindication
that might reduce the benefit?
• Are there social or cultural factors that might affect
the suitability of treatment or its acceptability?
• What do the patient and the patient’s family want?
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Doctors who changed a patient’s life
Today’s dogma may be tomorrow’s joke
She was a tall, distinguished looking, elderly woman who, despite
having severe nephrotic syndrome, still carried herself erect. My
inquiry about her medical history elicited a startling response.
Fifty years previously she had been an attractive, athletic young
woman, engaged to be married, when she developed severe
peripheral oedema. Her wealthy parents spared no expense in
obtaining the best medical opinions available. All the distinguished
doctors agreed that she had nephritis, that she should have strict
bed rest in a darkened room, and that the prognosis was grave,
telling her parents that she had, at most, six weeks to live.
After several weeks of full nursing care, it was apparent that not
only was she not dead, but that she was also no longer oedematous.
The experts again gathered and opined that she had indeed been
fortunate, but that she would be delicate for the rest of her short
life, and should avoid any physical exertion. They particularly
emphasised that pregnancy would be extremely dangerous.
The marriage went ahead, but the plans were drastically altered.
The couple bought a bungalow with a small garden rather than
the rather grand property that they had planned, so that she need
not exert herself. My patient and her husband realised that
abstinence was the only effective contraception, so their long
marriage was apparently never consummated.
Despite living the life of a semi›invalid, she did not have a
further day’s illness for 30 years, when she again developed severe
oedema. She consulted a famous doctor, whose specialty was not
nephrology. Without much of an investigation, he prescribed
steroids with dramatic effect. Twenty years later, for her third
episode of the nephrotic syndrome, I performed a renal biopsy
and countless other tests before prescribing steroids. The biopsy
showed minimal change nephropathy, a condition characterised
by relapses and remissions, either spontaneously or with the help
of steroids.
As doctors, we sometimes forget that our utterances may be
explicitly believed. The more dogmatic the statement and the
more distinguished the doctor, the more likely it is that
instructions may be slavishly obeyed. While the advice given to
my patient may have been correct by the knowledge of the day, it
was clearly nonsense, and it ruined her life. We should remember
that today’s dogma may be tomorrow’s joke, and that its
debunking may inadvertently leave some casualties in its wake.
John H Turney, consultant physician and nephrologist, Leeds
We welcome articles up to 600 words on topics such as
A memorable patient, A paper that changed my practice,My most
unfortunate mistake,or any other piece conveying instruction,
pathos, or humour. If possible the article should be supplied on a
disk. Permission is needed from the patient or a relative if an
identifiable patient is referred to.
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